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RECENT DECISIONS
pears established that henceforth each case must be decided on
its own facts, with the existence of the right to appointment of
counsel depending upon the fluctuating standard of a "fair trial.I'' s
The states object that this standard leaves them no certain
guide. The Court in the principal case has attempted to meet
this objection by emphasizing that the trial judge may assume the
function of counsel for the accused to guide him past errors that
may make the trial unfair. 9 The danger of otherwise valid con-
victions being voided on habeas corpus can be minimized by his
active role in the proceeding.
Criticism and consistent dissent have failed to overturn the
Betts rule, but they have succeeded in reducing its severity. There
has been a noticeable relaxation in the attitude of the Court as
to what aggravating circumstances are required to constitute
denial of a fair trial.2" The principal case is an illustration of
this trend.2 ' JOHN BUTALA, JR.
18 Compare Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728, 68 Sup. Ct. 1256 (1948), with
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 68 Sup. Ct. 1252 (1948), for different
results achieved under the fair trial doctrine on apparently indistinguishable
fact situations. Both cases expressly uphold the Betts v. Brady rule.
19 In Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437, 69 Sup. Ct. 184 (1948), also, the
court indicated that its decision might have been different had the trial judge
undertaken the function of counsel for the accused.
20 In Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672, 68 Sup. Ct. 1270 (1948), where the accused
was eighteen years old, had been previously convicted, and faced no difficult
legal issue, the Court held that he had been denied a fair trial. In Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 68 Sup. Ct. 1252 (1948), the trial judge, in imposing sen-
tence, orally reviewed the numerous prior arrests of the accused, who was not
represented by counsel. The possibility that the sentence had been influenced
by his assumption that the accused had been convicted in each instance, and
that counsel, had he been present, might have called attention to the court's
erroneous assumption, was held sufficient to constitute denial of a fair trial.
21 The only aggravating circumstances were evidentiary error and the trial
judge's reference in the presence of the jury to possible past convictions of
the accused.
STATE TAXATION -RECIPROCITY -EQUAL PROTECTION
A Delaware corporation with central offices in West Virginia
maintained four of its manufacturing plants in Ohio. In accord-
ance with statutes setting forth a formula for determining the
business situs of intangible property,1 an ad valorem tax was
assessed by the State of Ohio on the corporation's accounts re-
ceivable which had resulted from sales from a stock of its goods
S.Property of the kinds and classes mentioned in section 5328-2 of the
General Code, used in and arising out of business transacted in this state by,
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maintained within Ohio. The effect of the formula was to exempt
from taxation domestic corporations' accounts receivable result-
ing from sales from their stocks of goods maintained outside Ohio,
and to tax foreign corporations' accounts receivable resulting
from sales from their stocks of goods maintained within Ohio.
The exempted domestic intangibles were impliedly offered to the
taxing power of other states which might choose to adopt the
same business situs formula. The Supreme Court of Ohio sus-
tained the assessment.2 The United States Supreme Court, re-
versing the decision, held the taxing scheme discriminatory and
invalid under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because accounts of foreign corporations were taxed
while similar accounts of domestic corporations were not.3
The requirement of equal protection in relation to taxation
is simply that the states deal with parties similarly circumstanced
in a reasonably uniform manner.4 If the general operation of the
tax legislation is to adjust the burden of governmental expense
for or on behalf of a non-resident person.., shall be subject to taxation; and
all such property of persons residing in this state used in and arising out of
business transacted outside of this state, by, for or on behalf of such persons..
shall not be subject to taxation." OIo GEN. CODE § 5328-1.
"Property of the kinds and classes herein mentioned, when used in business,
shall be considered to arise out of business transacted in a state other than that
in which the owner thereof resides in the cases and circumstances following: In
the case of accounts receivable, when resulting from the sale of property...
from a stock of goods maintained therein .... The provisions of this section
shall be reciprocally applied, to the end that all property of the kinds and
classes mentioned in this section having a business situs in this state shall be
taxed herein and no property of such kinds and classes belonging to a person
residing in this state and having a business situs outside of this state shall be
taxed ... ." Omo GEN. CODE § 5328-2.
2 National Distillers Products Corp. v. Glander, 150 Ohio St. 229, 80 N.E.2d
863 (1948). That the Ohio business situs scheme violated due process was sug-
gested in 17 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 61 (1948). For one writer's interpretation of
the plan shortly after its enactment, see Note, 6 U. OF CIN. L. Rav. 61 (1932).
3 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562, 69 Sup. Ct. 1291 (1949).
The Court implied its conviction that there was also a violation of due process
but found it "inappropriate to decide the Due Process question." Attempts by
the states to tax intangibles of non-residents can be attacked, depending upon
the circumstances, on three constitutional grounds: due process, commerce
clause or equal protection. See: Chertcoff, Some Federal Constitutional Limita-
tions upon State Business Taxes on Multi-state Enterprises, 6 U. OF PiTT. L. Rav. 165
(1940); Notes, Congressional Consent to Discriminatory State Legislation, 45 COL.
L. REv. 927 (1945), The Due Process of State Taxation, 29 GEo. L.J. 271 (1940).
4 Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 55 Sup. Ct. 525 (1935).
That the states, in the exercise of their taxing power, are subject to the require-
ments of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Ohio
Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 159, 50 Sup. Ct. 310, 314 (1930).
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with a fair and reasonable degree of equality, the constitutional
requirement is satisfied.' The guarantee of equal protection ex-
tends to foreign corporations6 only if they have been duly licensed
to do business in the taxing state.' It is well settled that neither
the equal protection clause nor any other constitutional provision
prohibits taxation of the same property by more than one state.8
Any state which has extended benefits or protection to the tax-
payer, or which has acquired sovereign power over his property
by reason of its permanent situs within the state's boundaries may
make its exaction of taxes.9 Permissible multiple taxation under
the accepted concepts of state taxing power may in its cumulative
effect impose a financial burden of significant proportions, par-
ticularly upon corporations involved in multi-state operations.'"
The burdens of multiple taxation may be alleviated by the
enactment of reciprocal legislation" designed to establish self-
imposed limitations upon the taxing powers of the respective
enacting states. This type of voluntary cooperative action 2 among
5 Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 56 Sup. Ct. 252 (1935); overruled on other
grounds in Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 60 Sup. Ct. 406 (1939).
6 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562, 69 Sup. Ct. 1291 (1949).
"It has been implicit in all of our decisions since 1886 that a corporation is a
'person' within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." See dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas.
7 Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673, 65 Sup. Ct. 1220
(1945); cf. Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Murphy 207 S. C. 324,
35 S.E.2d 586 (1945). A typical example of the clause operating in favor of a
duly licensed foreign corporation was Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Harding,
272 U. S. 494, 47 Sup. Ct. 179 (1926).
8 State v. Northwest Airlines, 213 Minn. 395, 7 N.W.2d 691 (1942), afJ'd,
322 U. S. 292, 64 Sup. Ct. 950 (1944); State Tax Com. of Utah v. Aldrich,
316 U. S. 174, 62 Sup. Ct. 1008 (1942); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 338 Pa. 9,
12 A.2d 444 (1940), affd, Stewart v. Commonwealth, 312 U. S. 649, 61 Sup.
Ct. 445 (1940); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900 (1939).
For a panoramic sketch of the development in the law as regards multiple
taxation, see Bruton, Multi-State Taxation of Intangibles, 12 PENN. B.A.Q. 122
(1941).
9 Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U. S. 486, 67 Sup. Ct. 1400 (1947); see also
cases cited note 8 supra.
10 SEN. Doc. No. 69, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 234 (1943).
11 Faught, Reciprocity in State Taxation as the Next Step in Empirical Legislation,
92 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 258 (1944); Brady, Statutory Solution of Multiple Death
Taxation, 13 A.B.A.J. 147 (1927).
12 A more extensive use of the compact clause, U. S. CONsT. ART. 1, § 10, was
suggested in Frankfurter and Landis, A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE
L. J. 685 (1925), but inherent delays in ratification procedure, lack of flexi-
bility, difficulties of enforcement and other technical limitations have restricted
the utility of this clause in the tax field. SEN. Doc. No. 69, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
125 et seq. (1943).
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the states requires each enacting state to relinquish a portion of
its taxing power, such relinquishment being conditioned upon
similar action by other states. Reciprocal legislation "depends for
its full effect upon an event beyond the control of the enacting
legislature."' 3 However, its constitutional validity must be con-
sidered in the light of the situation prevailing as of the date of
the legislation without reference to possible future actions by the
legislatures of other states.14
In their efforts to derive as much revenue as possible from the
taxation of intangible property, the states may employ the reci-
procity device in one of two basic patterns. The statute may pro-
vide that the enacting state will grant an immunity or credit to
residents of foreign states which offer similar immunity or credit
to the enacting state's residents. Examples of this type of statute
may be found in the fields of inheritance taxation 5 and income
taxation. 6 The statute may, on the other hand, follow the lines
of the West Virginia statute approved in Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Fox." This statute taxed all personal property located within the
state; and all personal property located outside the state if owned
by West Virginia residents, except where such property was already
being taxed by other jurisdictions.' 8 Discrimination has been over-
come under the first-mentioned basic pattern by offering a favor-
able immunity to non-residents only to the extent that such
favoritism is reciprocated, and under the second basic pattern by
offering an exemption to residents only to the extent that their
property is actually taxed by other states.
The Ohio statute considered in the principal case does not
conform to either of the two basic patterns. Instead of offering
an exemption to residents of other states which see fit to enact
reciprocal legislation exempting Ohio residents, it taxes the for-
eign residents and exempts Ohio's, regardless of whether their
property has been taxed in other jurisdictions.
In reply to the appellant's allegation of unconstitutional dis-
a'Starr, Reciprocal and Retaliatory Legislation in American States, 21 MINN. L. REV.
371, 372 (1937).
'4 Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60, 40 Sup. Ct. 228 (1920).
is Notes, Legislative Efforts in New York to Avoid Multiplicity in Inheritance Taxa-
tion, 28 COL. L. REv. 806 (1928); Reciprocal and Retaliatory Tax Statutes, 43 HAR.
L. REv. 641 (1930).
16 Heer, Reciprocity-A Critical Appraisal of its Possibilities, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL TAX Ass'N. 350 (1940).
17 298 U. S. 193, 56 Sup. Ct. 773 (1936).
18 WEST VIRGINIA CODE C. 11, art. 5, §1.
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